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ILLEGALITY; CONSIDERATION: Enforcement of Contract
Arising From Lottery-like Transaction
An organization of gasoline retailers brings an action against a number
of independent and semi-independent gasoline stations to enjoin the use
of illegal means of competition-specifically business promotion by lottery.
The court in denying the injunction bases its decision on the absence of
one of the essential elements of a lottery, namely, consideration moving
from the customers to the retailers.1 Within a month a winner in one of
the drawings brings an action for conversion of the prize by the stations.
The defense is a lack of consideration given in return for the promise to
conduct the drawing and award the prizes. The court finds for the plaintiff,
which necessarily implies a finding of sufficient consideration.2 Under sim-
ilar circumstances, a later winner, perhaps heartened by the success of the
prior action, brings an action in debt for a money prize. His counsel proves
too much on the issue of consideration, and the judge dismisses the action
on the basis that the consideration pleaded indicates that the entire trans-
action was a lottery. 3 The cases seem anomalous, i.e., insufficient "consid-
eration" to precipitate the penal sanctions of the lottery statute4 coexisting
with sufficient consideration to enforce a contract. The sufficiency or insuffi-
ciency in each instance does not arise from any peculiarity of the transaction
involved, but is the result of statutory interpretation.
The practice of business promotion by questionable "give-away schemes"
is not a modern innovation. The "bank night" and "retail merchant" cases
of the 1930's and late 1940's brought the problems involved clearly into
focus in almost all jurisdictions, 5 and fairly recent cases in California,6 New
Jersey,7 and the federal courts 8 have re-examined and restated the issues.
1 For such a case see California Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp., 50 Cal.
2d 844, 330 P.2d 778, reversing, 322 P.2d 945 (Cal. D.C.A. 1958). Contra, Knox Indus.
Corp. v. State ex rel Scanland, 258 P.2d 910, (Okla. 1953); Featherstone v. Independent
Serv. Station Ass'n, 10 S.W.2d 124, (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). Compare, Peerles Prod.
Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 284 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
2 See St. Peter v. Pioneer Theatre Corp., 227 Ia. 1391, 291 N.W. 164 (1940) (bank
night case). Cf. People v. Rosen, 11 Cal. 2d 147, 78 P.2d 727, 116 A.L.R. 991 (1938);
Holmes v. Saunders, 114 Cal. App. 2d 389, 250 P.2d 269 (1952). The paucity of cases
in this area may be ascribed to the importance attached to "image maintenance" by
retailers.
3See People v. Rosen, supra note 2.
4 CAL. PEN. CODE § 319.
5 See People v. Gonzales, 62 Cal. App. 2d 274, 144 P.2d 605 (1944); St. Peter v.
Pioneer Theatre Corp., supra note 2; Clover v. Malloska, 238 Mich. 216, 213 N.W. 107
(1927); People v. Miller, 271 N.Y. 44, 2 N.E.2d 38 (1936); Knox Indus. Corp. v. State
ex rel Scanland, supra note 1; Featherstone v. Independent Service Station Ass'n, supra
note 1; Cowie v. La Crosse Theaters Co., 232 Wis. 153, 286 N.W. 707 (1939).
6 California Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp., 50 Cal. 2d 844, 330 P.2d
778 (1958); People v. Carpenter, 141 Cal. App. 2d 884, 297 P.2d 498 (1956).
7 Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 19 N.J. 39, 117 A.2d 487 (1955).
S Federal Communications Comm'n v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284
(1954); Caples Co. v. United States, 243 F.2d 232 (D.C. Cir. 1957); American Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 74 (S.D. N.Y. 1953).
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Due to a similarity in the "modus operandi"' of such schemes and in the
prohibitory statutes, most courts have concentrated on a single issue. Was
there such a consideration given in exchange for the chance to win the
prize as would bring the transaction within the penal statutes?O Absent
such consideration, the pall of illegality is removed and the operations con-
tinue with the blessing-as it were-of the courts. It is to be noted that the
courts in most of these cases had before them only the question of illegality.
A decision of the court that the scheme under appraisal does not constitute
a lottery because of the absence of a sufficient consideration, in its most
narrow construction, means simply that the consideration anticipated under
the provisions of the lottery statute does not exist. That such a decision is
not conclusive as to the presence or absence of consideration qua consider-
ation shall be demonstrated presently.
The relationship of consideration to the enforceability of a simple con-
tract would appear at first blush too obvious to warrant extensive citation.
But it is not with the requirement of consideration that we are dealing, but
rather with the nature of that which is required. As the general concept of
consideration has been enshrined in the codes, a cursory examination would
seem apropos."- The requirement of consideration as an element of every
contract is established in the California Civil Code at section 1550, which
provides in part that a .... sufficient cause or consideration" is essential to
the existence of contract. The concomitants are elaborated in other sections
of the codes;12 for our purposes we need only note two such ancillary doc-
trines. The first is the common law doctrine of detriment to the promisee
and benefit to the promisor, the California provision being alternative rather
than conjunctive. 3 The second doctrine is the "estoppel to deny," as a
substitute for consideration which finds expression as a conclusive pre-
sumption.'" The consideration necessary as one of the elements of a lottery
is found in the definitive section of the Penal Code which in part requires
9 The large number of cases involve some form of serially numbered tickets which
are used in the drawing. Tickets are given at the time of purchase and upon request
without the necessity of a purchase or without any request prior to any purchase. In
obvious attempts to evade the statutes involved, some retailers distribute a certain number
of tickets freely in neighborhoods contiguous to their establishments or make them readily
available at designated locations. The holders of tickets need not be present at the draw-
ings in order to win and generally attempts are made to eliminate anything which could
be called consideration.
10 The California lottery statute, CAL. PEN. CODE § 319, provides: "A lottery is any
scheme for the disposal or distribution of property by chance, among persons who have
paid or promised to pay any valuable consideration for the chance of obtaining such prop-
erty... upon any agreement... that it is to be distributed or disposed of by lot or chance
. ...." (Emphasis added.) Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1301 (1951); 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1948).
See generally Note, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 103 (1953).
"The code provisions are CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1550, 1605; CAL. CODE Cxv. Pnoc.
§ 1962; CAL. PEN. CODE § 319. See generally, Keyes, Cause and Consideration in Califor-
nia-A Re-Appraisal, 47 CALirF. L. REv. 74 (1959).
"2 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1605-15; CAL. CODE Cir. PRoc. § 1963.
"3Haney v. Takakura, 2 Cal. App. 2d 1, 37 P.2d 170 (1934); CAL. Crv. CODE
§ 1605.
"tCAL. CODE Civ. Poc. §1962 (3).
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a valuable "consideration" paid or promised to be paid in return for the
chance.',
Assuming for the moment that consideration is a constant rather than a
variable and further that the consideration mentioned in the Civil Code is
the same as that specified to be one of the elements of a lottery, the sub-
stance of the problem appears. Based upon the initial assumption-that of
constancy of consideration-it would appear that no matter what the nature
is of that called consideration in any particular transaction, it will be the
equivalent of what is called consideration in every other transaction. It
would therefore appear that a strict application of the rules of formal logic
will result in a finding of a lottery in every instance and the situations
posed initially would indeed be anomalous.:" In order to obviate such a
result there must be an area of differentiation. Such differentiation may be
quantitative or it may be based on some specific which has been read into
the statutes by the courts. A short summation of authorities will indicate
the general trend.
The California courts in discussing the consideration element of the
lottery have specified that the two or more persons must have paid or
promised to pay a consideration for the chance, without specifying what
will amount to consideration for this purpose;17 further that a detriment
to the promisee is not sufficient;' that a consideration paid partly for the
chance and partly for other purposes will be sufficient. 9 Under similar fact
situations, courts in other jurisdictions have based their decisions on the
theory of multilateral contracts as supplying the consideration; 20 that con-
sideration may be supplied by intermediate parties;21 that a detriment to
the promisee is sufficient;22 that, conversely, a detriment to the promisee is
insufficient; 23 that a benefit to the promisor is sufficient; 4 and that, on the
other hand, such benefit is insufficient.25 In many of these cases, although
sufficiency of consideration is a conclusion of law, the cases have been
decided on their facts.
The quantitative method has been championed by some courts in cases
involving the "giving away" of the lottery tickets indiscriminately as well
15 CAL. PEN. CODE § 319.
16 The actual syllogism, of course, would either assume the existence of the operative
facts or include such facts as part of the antecedent.
"7 Gayer v. Whelan, 59 Cal. App. 2d 255, 138 P.2d 763 (1943).
18 California Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp., 50 Cal. 2d 844, 330 P.2d
778 (1958).
19 Holmes v. Saunders, 114 Cal. App. 2d 389, 250 P.2d 269 (1952).
20 Cowie v. La Crosse Theaters Co., 232 Wis. 153, 286 N.W. 707 (1939).
21 Glover v. Malloska, 238 Mich. 216, 213 N.W. 107 (1927). Contra, R. J. Williams
Furniture Co. v. McComb Chamber of Commerce, 147 Miss. 649, 112 So. 579, 57 A.L.R.
421 (1927).
22 St. Peter v. Pioneer Theatre Corp., 227 Ia. 1391, 291 N.W. 164 (1940); Knox
Indus. Corp. v. State ex Tel. Scanland, 258 P.2d 910, (Okla. 1953); State ex rel. Regiz v.
Blumer, 236 Wis. 129, 294 N.W. 491 (1940).
23 See cases cited note 8 supra.
24 Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 19 N.J. 39, 117 A.2d 487 (1955); Featherstone v.
Independent Serv. Station Ass'n, 10 S.W.2d 124, (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
25 Federal Communications Comm'n v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284
(1954).
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as in return for purchases. The question of consideration has been decided
on the proportion of free tickets to the whole number of tickets involved,
thereby making sufficiency of consideration a conclusion discoverable by
mathematical formulation.2 6 This has been rejected in California.27 A Wis-
consin court found a sufficient consideration partially on a detriment to the
promisee and partially in the fact that the scheme must have been advan-
tageous to the promisor or he would not have continued to operate it.28
This might be called discovery of consideration from induction. It is sub-
mitted that the court should perforce limit its examination to relatively
mediate matters, in that a pronouncement such as this assumes that which
could only be ascertained by the most minute evaluation of the business
involved.
A satisfactory statement of the elements necessary in California is found
in People v. Cadras: "The question of consideration is not to be determined
from the standpoint of the defendant, but from that of the holders of the
prize tickets. The question is: Did the holders of the prize tickets pay a
valuable consideration for the chance?" 29 Again in the Cadras case the
court in discussing subparagraph three of the lottery statute, Penal Code
section 319, qualifies the statutory requirement of disposition to a person who
has paid a valuable consideration for the chance of winning the prize as being
4... one who has hazarded something of value upon the chance." 0 (Em-
phasis added.) This seems to be the view taken in the later cases.31 To this
extent Cadras is conclusive on the question of what amounts to consid-
eration in a lottery; it must be something of value which is hazarded by
the holders of the prize tickets in exchange for the chance, in effect, the
familiar "quid pro quo."
s 2
The practical aspect of proving the contract and the consideration de-
pends upon a showing by the plaintiff of something which will amount to
consideration, but will not be within the "thing of value given in exchange"
class. The stronger the plaintiffs case the closer he is to being thrown out
of court. This is definitely a situation where the preponderance of the evi-
dence will work contrary to the intention of the offering party. If the best
the plaintiff can do is plead a valuable consideration given in exchange for
the chance entirely or partially, the court will preclude him with a state-
ment to the effect that: ". . . 21 contract against public policy or against
the mandate of a statute may not be made the foundation of any action,
26 Featherstone v. Independent Serv. Station Ass'n, supra note 24.
27California Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp., 50 Cal. 2d 844, 330 P.2d
778 (1958); People v. Babdaty, 139 Cal. App. Supp. 791, 30 P.2d 634 (1934); People v.
Cadras, 137 Cal. App. Supp. 788, 28 P.2d 99 (1933).
28 State ex rel Regez v. Blumer, 236 Wis. 129, 294 N.W. 491 (1940).
29 People v. Cadras, 137 Cal. App. Supp. 798, 790, 791, 28 P.2d 99, 100.
so Ibid.
31 See California Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp., supra note 27; People
v. Carpenter, 141 Cal. App. 2d 884, 297 P.2d 498 (1956); Holmes v. Saunders, 114 Cal.
App. 2d 389, 250 P.2d 269 (1952); 17 CAL. Os. ATr'y GENt. 63 (1951); 9 CAL. Ops.
Arr'Y Gmr. 150 (1947).
32 Ibid.
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either in law or in equity." 3 The prohibition against basing a suit on an
illegal contract runs through this entire area and is controlling.
3 4
It will be a rare case where the plaintiff has the benefit of a precedent
decision on the legality of the very scheme he is attempting to enforce.3 5
The court will consider the question of legality first, and not until a deci-
sion is made on this point will further matters be considered. Again the
nature of the consideration that the plaintiff has pleaded may well be de-
terminative of the court's ruling on the lottery question, which ruling, if
adverse to the plaintiff, will determine the entire action.36
Under the provisions of Civil Code section 1605 the sufficient showing
of benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee will suffice to
demonstrate an enforceable contract, absent such factors as to make the
contract illegal. A very good statement of the benefit doctrine is found in
the recent case of Follansbee v. Benzenberg,37 where the court stated that
benefit includes anticipated or prospective profit, which may be as effectual
as an immediate or direct compensation, such as an opportunity to create
good will that might otherwise not have been accorded, and the fact a like
benefit might have been obtained in some other manner does not affect
the benefit received from the hope of future business.
The adoption38 of the Restatement rule,39 that consideration must be
something bargained for and given in return, may create an evidentiary
problem, but the main premise remains-that a benefit or detriment is suffi-
cient consideration to create an enforceable contract if it is proven. To
the extent that a recent case40 defining "good consideration" as used in the
Civil Code4 1 as equivalent to "valuable consideration" is decisive of the
terms used, the efficacy of the benefit and detriment doctrine as specified
therein might be seriously limited upon a re-examination of some of the
so-called lottery cases.
42
33 Stockton Morris Plan Co. v. California Tractor and Equip. Corp., 112 Cal. App.
2d 684, 689, 247 P.2d 90, 92 (1952); quoting from Hooper v. Baranti, 81 Cal. App. 2d
570, 574, 184 P.2d 688, 691 (1947).
34Lee On v. Long, 37 Cal. 2d 499, 324 P.2d 9 (1951); Kyne v. Kyne, 16 Cal. 2d
436, 106 P.2d 620 (1940); Reynolds v. Roll, 122 Cal. App. 2d 826, 266 P.2d 222 (1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 832 (1954); Stockton Morris Plan Co. v. California Tractor and
Equip. Corp., supra note 33; Shenson v. Fresno Meat Packing Co., 96 Cal. App. 2d 725,
216 P.2d 156 (1950).
35 For such a case see Holmes v. Williams, 127 Cal. App. 2d 377, 273 P.2d 931
(1954).
3G Holmes v. Saunders, 114 Cal. App. 2d 389, 250 P.2d 269 (1952); Holm v. Bram-
well, 20 Cal. App. 2d 332, 67 P.2d 144 (1937).
37 122 Cal. App. 2d 466, 471, 265 P.2d 183, 186 (1954).
31 Forgeron Inc. v. Hansen, 149 Cal. App. 2d 352, 308 P.2d 406 (1957).
39 "(1) Consideration for a promise is ... [something] bargained for and given in
exchange for the promise." RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 75 (1932).
40 Horton v. Kyburz, 53 Cal. 2d 59, 346 P.2d 399 (1959).
41 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1605.
42 On the strength of this case previous decisions holding benefit and detriment not
sufficient consideration for purposes of the lottery statute could be overruled.
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The estoppel to deny which is specified in the Code of Civil Procedure
43
has been closely related to Restatement of Contracts section 90.44 A some-
what recent case has specified that without reliance or substantial detriment
the doctrine will not be allowed.45 In Wade v. Markwell the court held
that estoppel is 'either a substitute for consideration or a species of consid-
eration.46 Application of the doctrine in order to evade the stringencies of
the lottery statute seems not to be overly fraught with difficulties. The "con-
sideration" or substitute therefor resulting from the application of the doc-
trine may always be considered as something entirely different from that
anticipated by the lottery statute.
47
It would appear that the courts could so extend the meaning of "con-
sideration" under the lottery statute as to make many presently legal opera-
tions lotteries. Such extension is not probable at this time, but so long as
the possibility exists it must be part of the equation. The likely antipathy
to extension of the scope of the lottery statute may be demonstrated by the
analogy of the application of the doctrine of unjust enrichment to patently
illegal contracts. In the recent case of Wilson v. Stearns4s the pronounce-
ments of Peters, f., concerning the application of the rule against enforce-
ment of illegal contracts was quoted with approval.49
Where by applying the rule the public cannot be protected because the trans-
action has been completed, where no serious moral turpitude is involved, where
the defendant is the one guilty of the greatest moral fault, and where to apply
the rule will be to permit the defendant to be unjustly enriched at the expense
of the plaintiff, the rule should not be applied.
This rule as expressed in Norwood v. Judd ° and reiterated in the Wilson
case as well as more recent cases,5 is a direct reversal of a previous case
which had specifically denied "unjust enrichment" as a basis for enforce-
ability of an illegal contract.52 Attempts might be made to extend the doc-
trine of Norwood v. Judd into situations where the court finds a lottery
but also finds that the plaintiff's equities are substantial.
43 CAL. CODE CiV. PRoc. § 1962 (3).
44 See Henrey v. Weinman, 157 Cal. App. 2d 360, 321 P.2d 117 (1958); Klien v.
Farmer, 85 Cal. App. 2d 545, 194 P.2d 106 (1948).
45 Henrey v. Weinman, supra note 44.
46 118 Cal. App. 2d 410, 417, 258 P.2d 497, 502 (1953); accord, Porter v. Commis-
sioner, 60 F.2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1932).
47 See generally Annots., 48 A.L.R.2d 1069 (1956); 124 A.L.R. 1248 (1940); Com-
ment, 5 STAN. L. REv. 783 (1953); Note 10 HASTINGS LJ. 435 (1959).
48 123 Cal. App. 2d 472, 267 P.2d 59 (1959).
40 Id. at 482, 267 P.2d at 66, quoting from Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal. App. 2d 276,
283, 209 P.2d 24, 31 (1949).
50 Id.
51 Matchett v. Gould, 131 Cal. App. 2d 821, 824, 281 P.2d 524, 528 (1955); Cain v.
Burns, 131 Cal. App. 2d 439, 444, 280 P.2d 888, 891 (1955).
52 "The rule as to nonenforceability of illegal contracts is not based upon any con-
sideration for the party against whom the relief is sought, and who may be benefited by
the refusal of the court to grant the same, but upon consideration of sound public policy."
Del Rey Realty Co. v. Fourl, 44 Cal. App. 2d 399, 403, 112 P.2d 649, 651 (1941).
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